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Abstract of
TH t v ABILITY 0 I 11 uRTb: L 01 I D NATU . GAS AS
EN~ Y saURC I
As the United states enters the 19Bo's, the need for secure
and efficient energy sources is rapidly moving to the forefront
of our foreign and domestic olicies. It is apparent that our
exist nee, as well as that of our allies. is closely tied 0 the
ability to secure e ergy resource. T e ortation of Liquified
atural G s (L G), by specially de i ed ships, from oil exporting
nations to energy consuming nations has been a highly touted
ener re"'ource. lhile the importati n of' LNG may be a viable
energy resource for many industrialized nations it does present
unique problems for American energy re ource plarming. h
Uni ted states has emb< ked 0 I a ation
stresses independence and efficiency
to ail on oth of hese accolliltS.
energy program that
d Ll G importation seems
HypaTH~S]!;Sl
United tates iportation of L G i . not a cost effective
energy resource due to I (1) de.pendence on foreign sources, (2)
transportation costs inclUding "hidden ll expenses involving shipping
subsidies, (J) safety regulations, and (4) pricing schemes by





In August of 19'77 my ship, the U. s. S. Julius A. Furer
( FG-6) , Vias returning to her homeport of Charleston, sout
Carolina after a two I.lOnth cruise to Gre t Bri tain to cele-
brate the Queen's Silver Jubilee when we were ordered to
lay to, even as we sighted the cooper t{i ver Bridge. After
several minutes of com..ments ,md questions by the crew, the
reason for the prolongation of our case of channel fever
became readily apparent. A 1'rge white sphere, which b' 'ely
cleared the bridge, was being towed to sea. Being a aval
Aviator, d a bi t perturbed at our delay. I immediately
commented on the heritage and diminished rnent 1 con ition of
anyone who would foul the 88<.:..S wi th :~.n object th,it Vlz.sn' t
flc;.t enouGh for even a helicopter to land upon. I soon
learned that the object of ray displeasure was one of the inde-
pently constructed spheres thc;.t later would b put in a ship's
hull to transport Liquif'ied aturELI Go.S.
Despite my less than ideul introduction to the Liqui-
ature.l GaS' industry, 1 '>"1",$ intrigued by the engineer-
d scope of the concept and d.ecided that L ':G would be
an intere:3ting and contraver.sial SUbject for a w.jor paper ..
In constructing this paper, one of the major problems t at
confronted me was the const:'U1t stu.te of flux of the U• ..:>. L G
industry. In the year that I have been following the SUbject
with ~n eye towards serious research, I have seen the major
contract negotiations stalled [wd ':.bandoned because of the
iii
inabi i ty to achieve a mutually agreeable ~)rice, 'three .'100
plus million ships were found uns~fe by the oast Gu rd, d
U.S. LNG tankers are either being l~id up or leased to foreign
shippers.
The major problem in researching the subject was not in
finding accurate technical data, vulid energy forecasts, or
information concernin:g the safety of' transportat-ton of L G,
but rather the hard fucts concernini; econoluic viability of
the entire scheme. Obviously I could. h2.ve tr-;ucen the easy way
out and lIprov3d II that LHG imi,ortu.tion is not a viable enerGY
resource because it has fallen on such hard times but I oe-
lieve th:o.\t the're d.re even more fundamental difficulties vrl th
the L -G importation industry 2nd these problems ','.'ill be discus-
sed in the text and summarized.
iv
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Back[zo LUld • at r', 1 gas usage in the Uni ted ~ tates has
increased to tho point where it h s become Ollr number one do-
rr.estic eneriSY resource. 'I'oday natural gas supplie3 roughly
twenty-six percent of our nations total energy usage. l Table
1 illustro.tes natural gas consumption in comparison to the
other major enerGY resources:
I.\'-lblp- 1








I 'fotal u. ::). Consumption ?cL 0 (iuads
,
Data from u. s. Dept. of Energy, compiled by ..B. Hunsiker
The United states has roughly eight percent of the
world' 3 proven natural gas re,s8rves; approximately 201 Quad
A Quad is defined as one quadrillion Bri tish rrhermal Uni t~;,
(B1rU) or 1015 BTU and is a t rm v.-hich is used exten3ively to
measure Drimz.ry energy reserves and commmption. In order for
the reader to g in an appreciation of the energy of a Quad,
the follov:ing equivalent are provided: a Quad equals 40
million tons of coal, 24 million tons of petroleum, one tril-
lion (10 12 ) cubic feet of natural gas, or 500,000 barrels per
1
ds.y of oil for a full year. ...:n..... le this figure may seem stag-
gering, one must realize that Noerica used 78 uads in 19BO,
and al ost 56 Qu~ds c~ne from our domestic natural resources.
we consumed 20 uads, .l.'oughly 10 percent, of the estimated
201 Quads of our ovm natural gas reserves las~ ye alone.
hy has natural gas beco.e the premium fuel of our economy?
j'Ta'tural G,:..s Devolopments. Natural g s is a generic
term usually applied to ;:, mixture of predominantly hydro-
carbon g ses found in subsurface rock reservoirs. atural
gas is usually made up of 05 to 95 percent methane ·nd vari-
ous concentrations of ethane, propane, and butane. !{lO t
ilmericuns are familiar with what is gener' ly terned asso-
ciated gas, which is usually the volatile par ion of crude
oil found in varyin~ .i.ycoportio s wherever crude oil is dis-
covered. non-associated gas is totu.lly unre.lated to liquid
all accll..TJ1ulations und it is also ci major ener 'y resource.
One of the most important factors in the worle,' s gas supply
has been the large runol.mtG of wastage through the process of
"1'1 ing ol~flt natural gas in fields that h' ve a low gas to
oil ratio. Unless a pipeline w~s nearby or thera va
exceptionally large supply of gas, it was simply uneconomical
to try to store or trans00rt the gas. Thus, all of th. gas
that W2,S not used for l'einjection, to maintain the oil extrac-
tion prossure, was simply ignited at the well head. It is
estimated that Saudi Arabia flared amounts exceedin 14,000
million cubic meters 8. year - the equivalent of 12 million
2
tons of crude oiI. 2
In the United states the flaring off of unw~te gas
lS virtually non-existent because of a tremendous capital
investment of almost one million mile of distribution ,tJipe-
lines. Presently, high pressure, high volume transmission
pipelines link all of the 10 e 413 ",tates, and pipelines are
available to lin all associated and non-associated field •
This vast distribution sys em is actu lly a double edged
sorel. hile efficient distri u ion has as",ured hat all
potential resource area.s can be served, it has also led to
tremendous'demand for large industrial and domestic services.
r'ederal G2S Policies. For marlY years t 1e federal gover -
mont held down the price of natural gas to unrealistic levelv.
resultinG in little incentive to explore for ne\ gas resource.
This first became obvious to Americ2U13 in 1969 \'Ihen natural
gas suppliers were forced to refuse requests for new indus-
trial and domestic services in much of' the co try. This
oriGin~.:.l e;as snort age was a harbinGer of tnings 1;0 come and
in 1976 und 1977 critical gas Sl10rtages forced Congress to
enact the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1973. With this act,
Con ress hoped to allow tne price of n<:lwly discovered natural
ga.." natur as diocovered later thrill lj69, to radually
increase to a price that would pe natural gas prices 0 the
oil BTU equivent by 19tJ5. J The!l1~ jor problem wi th this
act \VCi.S that onbress assumed imported oil would cOot 15
doll s per barrel in 19t15 and already most importe oil is
J
se ling in excess of 3d dol ars per barrel. Prior to tile
Nat .r 1 Gas Policy Act of 19'78 which introduced decontrol,
it simply was not economical for evelopers to explore for
new reserves at a price that Vias over JO percent below mar-
ket eq ivalent.
Since 197d explorations have revealed vast new fields
in the Tilest and Gulf Coast,. Nevertheless, actual production
of natural gas has exceeded new diGcoveries by approximately
40 percent. fllost of the new discoveries are in deep welL"
over l5tOOO feet, but ~3ain "tois 'phenome on was almost rna -
dated by Congres becaus3 tho actlilows gas drillers -to
charge u to 6 dollars per million BTUs for neW deep ga com-
pared to 2 dollars per million ETLJs for new shallo,,'/ gas. 4
the gas development industry has found' it more profitable to
concentrate its capi talon deup walls, hopil for a greater'
return. 'i1he comp~exi ty of the datural as Policy Act has
caused develo;Jers to bypass snallow gas res rves and actually
has created some~hat of a shortage. Des ita the fact that
production is still outstripTJ: discoveries most, sources
believe W~ will be ;:tble to continue current natural gas pro-
duction levels for about 30 years. able 2 gives a graphic
dc~ scription of' hov/ mO[:lt current production levels will con-
tinue to be met, but it is interestin.; to note tllat demand
will continue to rise.
4
Table 2
SOURCE: FPC, NatioDal Gas SUpply and Demand, 1971-l9~0.




















Decontrol, tax incentives. and cons rvation wi not put
more gas in t e ground. Because of natural gas' high caloric
value and extremely clean burning properties it has been the
ruel of choice for industry and domestic use. These proer-
ties would still make natural gas an extremely attractive
fuel even if it were not currently priced 20 to 30 percent
below imported oil of equivalent BTU capabilities. These
qualities. coupled ith the tremendous investment we have in
distribution systems, make it mandatory that we explore all
possibilities for securing reliable and plentiful gas supplies.
There are many unconventional gas production resource
schemes under study. Among the mo t promising are, ex rac-
tion from Devonian Shale. Tight fu~ds. Geopressurized zones,
5
and synthetic p-roduction from cod. All 0 f these methou 3
h ve promise but they arG years away from pr ctical and
economic feasibility.
LNG Development. One method 0 f lncreasin,:; natural gas
supplies to the United states is the import~tion of Li_uified
Natural as (LNG) in specially desibn8 1 shii)S from oil ex-
portin nations. I't'iany argue tnat LNG will supply our needs
until the other unconventional methods of natural gas produc-
tion beco feasi ble. t ers arg e t!lc:.t L m importation
m es u more dependent on l'orOitIn energy sources an t" at
the entire process is too costly in ensrJY usage and capital
inve tenent. larry ai-hers "tre concerned :J.bout the safety fea-
tures of such Cl potentially dangerous proces. \"jhil the
potential safety aspect.s cannot be tot"3.l1y ignored, it mu t
be realized. thut 11~G operations have an enviable safety
record and as lont.> a vIe are involved in 6,n energy shortage
our Gc(momy will (iernand that we explore and utilize all poten-
tial energy sources. While the ..public maybe concern d about
potential disasters the most likely result will be stringent
saf6ty reGulations, costlY proGcduros for traini and
operation, :~nd sophis~icated equipment;. practically speaking t
it wov.ld be difficult to I'estrict the usage- of an ener y re-
source based solely on a worst-ca e scenario. It ap ears
tnat the importation of' L G will most likely cantin e to
increase despite potential safety problems. The nost impor-
tant aspect of LNG im ortatian to the Uni e states is the
6
cost effective asp~ct of this energy intensive import re ource.
Although LNG has been produced ana. utilized for years,
the AJnerican public has only recently beeol/,e aware of' its
role in our energy mix. This has bean a result of increased
public a':V2reness and media attention to our energy snortage •
The shec.i.r size of' the receiving terminals, and transport
vessels has caugnt the public's attention. lhe idea for
liquifica"'cion of n~~tural gas to reduce its volume for efficient
tran port,tion was first patented in 1914. 5 It was not until
the 1940's that t e process became commercially feasible and
tn8 first "peak shavine;" facili ti. as were con:Jtructed.
Uharacteristics of LN. One pro erty of natural gas
that makes the liquification process 30 difficult is he fact
that nLtural gas cannot be liouified by simply increasing the
pressure. It must be cooled below its critical tomper2tura
of minus 100 degree s Fahrenheit "end even then the pressure
/
must be on the order of 600 PSI to maintain a licuid state.o
~his cre~tes consid~rQble probl ros becaus8 of tn~ expense of
ciesigninc and producing trans ortation containers that would
be capable of holdin~ large quantities of L at high pre",-
sures and cool temper3.tures. 'l'he iligh pressures of ~he
container would also present an unacceptable sa£ety risk if
8. leal{ should occur. 'i'he safest and most cOd1 affective
solution is to 00Q1 the n<.},turro.,l gas to rninuG 260 degrees
rahrenhei t and main"t8.,in 4 to 10 PSI internal pressure. he
low' pressures assure that lelll{s ',','ould not be as catastrophic.
7
The actual process of' cooling gases belovi minus 240 degrees
ahrenhei tis ~8rrnGd I·cryogonic oS II an:} the p occas has been
used for years for such conUllon gases as oxygen, ni troge •
;:Lnd heli urn for . ndustrial processes.'? By coolin' natural
gas to i liquid state we can convert bOO cubic feet of free
gas at atmo pheric pressure to one cubic foot of liquid.
This reduction in volume is I,·...i1.::; t makes the transporta-tio
and storage of NG feasible.
Pe :::}r '-<h~vin,::r
....... \. ..J (.:i.. '? ~hG earliest practical use of LIG was
for "peak shaving" purpose.:..;. L Gis often stored to meet
peak winter demand for residential heating.- Uau::L.lly a com-
mercial user's demand ,ill remain r~l tively constant by
volume percentabe regardlesc:' of weather conditions, however
domestic custom r demand luctuat S '.vi h emperature.
his increased demand placed on the distribution system y
cold ether i.s of en quite hi h and some type of temporary
addi tional sup.",ly is usually required. In the construction
of' long-di t,U1c8 naturcU gas pip~lines the u.sual practice is
to size the pipeline larger than the aV8!'::_ge yearly demand
r,_,-tes and this allows the gas distributor to store LNG during
the summer months. -'he di tribution system can then meet
peak d ands by increasing he nonnal capnciiy 15 to 20 per-
cent by ofJerating 1 of the compression equipment througnout
the distribution system at t e maximruu possible flow rate and
release regasified L G into the pipelines. 'n'll s "peak h' ving"
system ensures adequ- t supply for the increased demand but
the costs of liquification of the excess gas, storage in ex-
8
pensive insulated t&nkG, ond regasification is quito high.
For r.1any years "peak shaving" facilities relied on the
excess dom.estic gas supply of 10\'! clemcmd cycles to stock
their tanlcs. Hoviever, the maximum cunount of LNG which can be
produced at y one liquification site is limited to approx-
imately 20 percent ai' the u~illtity of g2.S which drops from
pipeline pressure to low pressure b€lcause of tne need to main-
t · 1 . 'j . l' 8. d NG ak .aln vo ume lD 1; 18 plpe lnes. '1'0 ay, L!" "pe s aVJ.ng"
pllli~ts vary in si~e from small ~-tellite pi ts resembling
L-,rge golf balls with a cap::1city 01~ 10,000 barrels, the equiv-
alent of 35 mil Lion cubic feet of natural gas, to very large
multi-tank fa.cili ties VIi th the largest temks having a capacity
of 580,000 barrels or 2 billion cubic feot of natural bas.9
Each t8~~ has ~he capacity to heat a city of 75,000 people
for two months.
'llhe importation of L."G for "pea:";: shaving" facili ties
began for the Uni ted states in 1~)68 when the Bo :3ton Gas
Comp~:my began importing s:nipr.'l::mts of LNG from Algeria. The
Uni-ted states began to export Ll~G in 1969 under lon!r erm
10contracts for gas from Alas a to Japan. Today L~G is us~d
in the United tates and other industrialized nations not only
for "peak shaving" but also as an actual 'base load for domes-
tic pipelines.
Internati,onal Conojderntions. Ninety-five percent of
<:ill natural gas wi1.ic:h cro:'.;ses intern;::.tional borders- is tr
t . . l' 11par ed Vla plpe lne. '.J:1he developmGnt of cryoGenIc3 hc.~~
9
allowed trans)orto.tion of L G in specially designed ships to
nations which are beyond the economic nmge of pipeline can'"
struction. Presently the United states imports natural gas
from Canada and i'lexieo at rates roughly equivalent to the
B'l'U content of' oil. !\t the same time we are importing rela'"
tively small r"j,uanti ties of LNG via ships from Algeria. i'!.ost
estern .t.uro)ean nations ~nd J'apan also import LNG via t kers
and these nations aPl,Jear to be making plans t'o import as much
as ~he markGt candi titOns vlill allow. One of the basic uues-
tions which must be addressed Does the importation of
L lG make economic sense for the United 0tates or ars vIe
simply trying to compete with all users in a scarce energy
marl~et? Obviously, this type of question strikes a,t the very
hec:.rt of a free market system,but when the government and
the ci~izens, tn~ough taxation and subsidization, must foot
part of the costs they should have an input to ensure that
the enterprise is in their best interests and. not simply a
p~ofi t scheme for a few companies. 'l'he decision makers nust
consider the tremendous capi tal costs I subsidies. safety
aspects, and energy alternatives to decide what is the e..;.t
course of action and not just a rais6'Uided c.esire to compete
or generate profits for a few companies •
.r'oreign Dependence. Despite the obvious need to develop
~nd manare ~ll practical energy resources the United t tes
fiU t also consider the adverse impacts of dependence on
foreign sources. In plain and simple t';~rms, we ·-.re the leader
10
of the free-world and our pOlicies <:md actions must be based
upon extremely hie-h standards. I'::uch of the Vlorld looks a
erica to set the ex aple of economic prosperity based on
a free market economy and trade between 11 nations.. We
must avoid even the perception of being forced into pGlicy
decisions. based upon a dependence on foreign energy imports.
'rho thought of tlle \'10 rId , s foremost economic and political
power being hllins~rung by dependence on unsecure imports
would have catastrophic repercussions throughout the world
economy. In snort, if tna United stdtes cannot solve its
energy problem the rest of the world, particularly developing
nations, c<:::.nnot look foreward to economic prosperi ty or' ~.
stable world. (,see Ap~ endix I)
Presently the United states imports natural gas via
pipeline from Canada and exico at prices ranging from
~?3.1+5 to ..4.47 per million B'rD. Comparing this to the BTU
011 equivalent, the prices range from "27 • .50 to ~3J. 60 2-
barrel. 12 hile this pY'ice may seem r~asonabl'€ it does not
reflect the tremendous capi t:Cl.l fund:..> involved in pipeline
o.i stribution which are si8nific;;:illtly higher tnan oil refinery
costs. One of the major advantages to pipeline import;_:tion
is the fact that the money St:::1YS in the l~orth Ameri can eco-
nomic sphere. ho)efully raising the economy and encouraging
the (levelopm.ent of our neighboring countries. ·,'hile i may
seem th<;.t we s.re becoming dependent on ju~"t two sources of
imported natural gas we sl10uld also recognize the fact th~.t
11
strong trade relationships ~ i th our nei~;hbors '.'Jill enhance
Ollr security alld the st2.bili ty of our neighbors.
By restricting our natural gas importation to pipe-
lines we may also benefit our allies by avoidinG costly
comp~tition for scarce nc:~tural resources. . any .tourope
nations and Japan have signific t enerby resource problems
and th8'Y are planning on imported. LIW as a m<..~jor contributor
to their energy mix. The United states should not avoid
the LNG com.peti tion s.illlply out of altruism but at the same
time we snould not enter the I:,rena simply from a spiri t of
competition and econoraic reqard for a few corporations. 1,' e
need to stUliy Lim importation. and make a deoision b6.sed u~on
economic viability <ind nat~onCi.l interest.
'roday we can see V~ist chG.nges in the vlorld-\vide LNG
indu3try. The foreign producers are engaged in a crusade to
rai s e the pric e c.f natural gas to an oi 1 B'IIU e(~uivalent.
Already Algeria has achieved a pricing contract with France
that will raise the price to $5.00 per million B u. 1J The
cOlnpletion of pipe~ines to Italy and Spain has aL.. o'sed.
Algerie:. to continue to export natural as ~....hile negotiating
favorable contracts wi th B'uropean purchasers of L1 G. Italy
and 'pain are quite conte.1t to receive as much natural gas as
the Algerians will send and tae Al8"eri"lIlS no lon,;er have to
depend on a single mode of ga exportatIon.
One f.:unerican comp2..ny. ~l aso atur· Gas. has recen ly
t rminate its . G operations becau38 of an inabili y to
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achieve a favorable price contract \O."i th Algeria. 1 Paso
was by far the largest American importer of' L G and the com-
pany is nO\v left wi th nine large LIm tanli.:ers and two operating
terminals for regasification.
Natural gas exporting nations realize that decontrol of
dome tic gas in the Dnited states has allowed prices to rise
Elnd their resource value has also risen on the ,:uTI8ric<:ll mar-
ket. Like all gas producers they are lad to see the price
of gas ris~ but tne distributors like El Paso prefer to see
the price of natural gas lower to ensure t118.t consumer con-
servation does not deplete their prof'i ta. 'llhe di stributors
must alw3Ys keep a significcmt amount of natural gas in the
pipelines or stor8.ge fElci 1i ti as to en:.!ure safe and uninter-
rupted flow. This gas earns them nothing and conservation
with high prices can seriously disrupt their business. At
the S~le time competition m~ong ~uropean nations and Jap
for hatur2.l gas has given exporters a favorable market.
Algeria has announced that it will no longer pursue
LNG exportation as a long range national economic policy.
The pipelines to ..';;urope h::i-ve as:·:;ured her a market and all of
the expense of further di tribution will be passed on to the
importing nation or company. SCarce capital and high inter-
est rate hrve made the construction of lirluification facili-
ties very expensive and the eXDorting nations would rather
simply sell their gas via pipeline without the dependence
on foreign capit~..... l 2nd tec~lnolo(:';Y to keep their liquification
IJ
facilities operating and expanding. As pipelines reach more
producing nations the trend away from liquifica ion faci1i-
ties at the xport terminal will undaubtably i crease. T e
Persian Gulf area can e expected to move tovlards pipeline
trans art in t e ne<oi.r future if and when the political situ-
ation stabi~izes. Ho\vever. major LN export f::.tcili ties c",n
be expected to continue ~.::.nd actually increase in nations
such as ·igeria and Indonesia.
s the di stance increase :t'rom exportinG liquification
facili ty to importing terminCi.l the transportation costs will
increase, p_imarily as a result of the number of L ankers
needed to maintain a l'moving pipeline. It In order to operate
an efficient receiving terminal the tankers must arrive at ~
frequency that will allow planned continuQus operation of the
storage and gasification facilities-. 'llhe tani~ers must also
be able to receive their c,-.:.rgo on thle 3nd at the edeter-
wined quantity. Presently, LNG t[mkers must s'Pend 50 percent
of' tneir actual voyage titn,e in ballast. :enese extensive op-
erE,.tions rna}~e r81iable supply contracts ve:cy import:::t.nt to any
nation that plans on using imported LPG as a significant con-
tributor to its energy needs.
Presently most h'uropean nations are stri!-,ing b<3..rgains
wi th exporting nations the.t Elre significantly higher th~
oil BTU equivalents simply to ensure long term
( ) . th t· t' t . ll~up to 20 years Wl guaran -eed qU2m l :L8S.
contr~cts
O-bviously
these nations are barJdne heavily on increasing energy co ts
and a continuing energy shortage. American companies are not
allov:ed to enter into tilese lonG-term, high-!)riced c(;mtracts
because Congress has mandated that they must pure ase t leir
natural as for importation at the lowest cost available.
Thus, the exporting n:Oltions havo no e;uarantee that the
American companies would. be able to leg ly fulfill their
contr:Lctual obligations. ;:chis legal restriction has hamper-
ed American entry into some markets but has ~lso served to
avoid a mu ti-nutional contract bidding Quction with only
one beneficiary: the exporti nation.
The 11ITl8ric::ill £1' G companies arGue that even -thouGh L G
is imported from foreign SO"<1.rces, it v!ill actually cut our
dependence on anyone source of foreign energy by increasin~
the number of nations from which we import energy. At first
gldnce, this argument makes some sense, unfortunately most
nations that export h-JG are also members of OPEC and a pru-
dent person would assume that their L1W exporting pOlicies
would be closely tied to their oil policies. }~erican LqG
compenies also are;ue that when a nation invests vasts sums
of capital in li~uific~tlon facilities and port improvements
that the nution would be less likely to provoke importers
because of the revenues needed to operate tile facilities
and payoff capital investments. However, the industry is
being less th~m cundid by not also pointing out that for
some projects as much as 90 percent of the initial capi
is foreign investment. 15 l\'luch of this may be petro-a.ollars
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but it is foreign capi'tal investment none eless.
American LiTG companies also argue thb.t these acilities
offer a m ket for American technolo5Y and management exper-
ti.se. If we look furtiler into this theory ,some flaws become
<wparent. any of the nations which have developed L G ex-
porting facili ties ar€ already 8wimminB; in petro-doll~,-rs
and have little real need for more state income accordin to
their economic plans. The 11\"G facili ties wei~e prolJloted and
d8veloped as .iaint ventUJtes by the companies involved and the
exporting nations. One of the major selling points of these
joint ventures v.,ras that tne liquif'ication and port facilities
l,\'ould provide an inctustri2.1 base to their ecanomie and also
provide c. diver,sified job market for local pO,.Julations.
'llhe complexiti es 01' these pl~~nts has made the se promi es all
but disappear. l'he pLmts s.re so complex c::ncr vast th;),t pro-
per management and maintenance by forei~n technicians is u
must. In addi tion most parts needed to m.::dntain and operate
the plants must be imported from the industrialized nations
at high costs. t.verything from complicated electronic
components and valve assemblies to the tires for mainten-
ance trucks mu.st usually be imported. 'l'he local pODulation
is often reduced to menia.l maintenance tasks or feather-
bed.ding management positions with little real production
8.uthority. 'i'his of'ten leads to inefficient m8.nagement ant
strained working re1;~,tionshipG. l'.l© st eX.~)Qrting nations
have developin~~ economiGs \'lilich generally requ.ire basic
16
in ustri lization before moving into the hi h technolo y
spheres of natural gas liquification and the like.
Tr2...Y1SDort:;.tion Costs. LNG importation is basically an
energy transportation and distribution industry. 1'he first
oce2~ transport of L G occurred in 1959 when the ~ethane
Pioneer, a converted dry cargo ship, successfully trans-
porteu 5,000 cubic meters of LNG from Lake Charles, Louisi-
ana to Canvey Island at the head of the Thames stuary in
England. 16 The Methane Pioneer remained in service for two
years and made sev ral successful voyages. (Fig. 1)
(II) A ..is/D//e (ex-Me/hiZ"e Piolleer)
It became obvious that in order to re lize y economie
of scale Lr·G tank rs would have to increase in size to roughly
an equivalent of the Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC). In
addition the number of vessels devoted to a particular p 0-
ject must be sufficient to ensure a stable supply of G at
the receiving terminal and little delays at the exporting
liquification f<: cili ty. 1'0 st large L'iG tankers require ap-
proximately 24 hours· to offload and turnaround, while loading
17
time may exceed Itt) hours. In ordce, 1;0 be e£fici nt thece
vessels musi; maintain 8. rigid schedule. i'he average round
trip time for the laxge LN tankers from Arze'N, Algeria to
the ast Coas of the Uni ted :3t;.:;.tes is approximately 20 days.
If the ederal Power Commission's forecasts of LNG importa-
tion as outline in table 2 are true, this \.'.'i11 mean that tne
Uni ted tates LNG importation industry "vill rer-uire approx-
imately 100 L G tanker;:> of the 125, 000 cubic meter cap ci ty
and 6 to U receiving terminuls. 17 This will mean that
L 'G tanker will call at each terminal every LI-O hours. The
capi tal inv~,stment in 100 ships wi th price tags of 125 mil-
lion dollars a piece is staggering.
l'he actual shipborne transportation of the L·m product
is not the major cost. The energy costs for the li0uifi-
cation are the highest porti.on of the L G process, approx-
imately 15 percent of the caloric value of the gas which lS
finally liquified is used just for that process. 18 he
entire liquiflcation, transportation, and regasification
process is less tiw.n 70 percent energy efficient. Approxi-
mately () to 10 <.;rcent of' the enerGY value is used during
the transportati on by ship. 'hi G is no t wastage howevel~t
because the tankers "boil off" LNG to use in their engines
when they are on the high seas. 'l'he Vni ted states does not
allow the vessels to use L G for propulsion when entering
Americ harbor und. this has cau ed an increased expense for
dual fuel boilers for vessels ex ectin to operate in our
18
waters.
i ile the transporta~ion of LNG in large expensive
tankers I:l:-~ seem extravagent, the actual pBrcentage of the
transportation cost as related to the viell-head price of
natural gas will GO do','m "ii th each increase in gas prices.
liInerican LNG importers a.re confident that decontrol of'
natural gas ill allow the domestic and pipeline prices to
raise to a point where im~0rte LTG will appear to be an
attractive alternative.
subsidies. ~ erchant sipping has ;:.;,lvrays played :... tre-
mendous role in the economic health of Americ;.:, and the
federal g overrun~nt ha.s maintClin...~d strong interest in the
promotion of' the maritime transportatio industry. 'rhe LNG
inuustry is no exception. Despite the conflicting re la-
tions governing gas price control and energy independence
the Feder~l Government has actively supported and subsidized
the construction of' m~my L G Tankers.
'l'he ] erch~i11t I arine Act of 1936 as ended in 1 70
{PUblic Law 91-469} has made United states flag construction
more attr~ctive than ever before. The Maritime Admi 'stra-
tion is now i:"<uthorized to pay construction - differential
su sidies to r'ed.uce the cost difference between building a
ship in a U.S. shipyard and the cosu~of building the vessel
i a foreign yard. This c~st difference cannot be greater
than 50 percent, d tanker construction costs usually
only vary about 25 percent higher than foreign construction
19
C03tS. (see table J)
'rABL~ J
Vessel type (;on[-3truct.lon co~;ts II _.
125,000 cubic meters u. s. rope
I OSS :~90 mil '67 mil
N!El BRANE 100 mil eo mil
hese coste illustrate that American s!1ipyards are
generally more competitive when constructing high-technology
sophisticated ships. Thg current construction differential
sUbsidy barely m<.tices VLCC construction viable in U•• yards
and their is so much overtonnage in almost all types of ship-
ping the subsidies h;:lVe not brought tne urnount 01' \'Jorlc that
was anticipated to Arneric shipyards. Table 4 illust~ates
the L G construction subsidies of FY 79.
Table 4
LNG construction 3ubsidies























ISource~ Annual report of th0 •ari time Admini stration for
fiscal year 1979. JJly 30.
unfortunately, t118 eagan' dministration is said to be
f'Hvorably considering the withdrawl of all CD funds s a
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belt - t'ghtening me ure on the federal budget. 19 'his
~ould seriou ly effect L tanker constructio in American
shipy ds. he Office 0 anagement and B dget has suggested
the compl te elimination of the 107 million dollar C' rter
propos for C S.20 They feel that since only a few ships
are built using CD ,the withdrawl of fundi would not eri-
ously a.ffect NneI"can shipyards and the increase in naval
shipbuilci'n should more than offset any impacts. trangely
enough, the American shipyards have not vigorously opposed
this ro 0 a.l to date, however, t e ill' itime unions and ship-
ovmers have trongly oppo ed a reduct'on in CDS funding.
One of the adverse effects of C funding can be seen
by t e large percent,Joge of American flag G tankers that
are curren ly employed as 'W star 06 facilities or Iayed
up d out of service. 1he construction subsidies 10\' the
shipowners to t \:e the tankers out of service at y time
and ;..·,ccumulate de reciation time at a ...,traig t line rate of
l} to 5 percent annually. '.,'hen one consider tha e owners
a ly paid for roucih1y two thirds of the vessel and the re-
mainder ~as financed under loan arantees from Title XI
at low in erest rates, it b come obvious that the owners
are not losing money when they lay up the L G t kers for a
s art period of time. As he time increases a her costs
relating to tne receiving terminals and ship maintenance
begin to effect the camp ny.
Title XI Loan Guar tees.
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i tIe XI of the r~ erchant
Marine Act authorizes federal ship finzillcing guar tees to
American shipovmers Vt,l.ho construct shipu in American ship-
yards.. As of the end of fi "'cal year 1980 over 6 .. Lj.billion
dollars of financing guarantees y the federal government
were in force. Of this total,approximately 1.4 billion
dollars covered the construction of 16 G tankers and there
are pend"ng applications for 17 more LNG tanker guar tees
for an addi tiona.l L 6 billion dollars. 21 It is important to
note that this is not money that the federal government has
spent. it lS a guarantee to the lender hat he federal
government will pay the loans i he shipowner default.
arantee progrdefaults in the history of "the '.(litle XI
Actually the program has een very successful ith only 12
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Under 'ri tIe XI the 'ipovmers are eligible for ~.;overrunent
mortgage guarantees, ranging from 75 to U,? 5 ercent of' the
vessel cost. In addition,they may be eligible for direct
guvernment loans ith a downpayment oJ 25 percent and some
Ll~ G tankers h ve even received funds under -ooctwn p):fl:r ational
defense features. 23 ~hese features in~lude such items as
increa ed shaft horsepower. nuclear, bioLogical. d cherni-
cal w shdo~n ca9abilities, increased turQo generating capacity,
large boom cranes, 2d1d at-sea fuelin stations. The federal
Gov"rrunent subsidizes Mlerican 1'1218 vessels fo:r these features
so th~it t ey c~m be used during time of' s or crisi"" but the
U8'€ of L G tankers in a convoy or v.,rar zone v.lOuld hardly seem
Prudent.
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Oper ting SUb3idi eSt 'Ehe Merchant Marine Act au ttwri zes
the t aritime Administr~tion to pay operatin - differental
subsidies, (ODS), to lWlericCl.l'l shipping companies in order to
help offset the hi:cher price of operating an American flag
vessel. These ODS funds are available for essential trade
routes and essential cargoes. currently tankers do not
receive OD funding and unless the goverrunent makes a d.e-
termined commitment to import L~G as a vital part of our
enerGY mix, it is unlikely hat LNG shipowncrs \'lill benefit
fro this program.
ecause of the rel&tively small cr~\'l 811Q the hit;\h level
of training involved it is unlikely that L~G shippers ,ill
rely on ODS to help defray labor C03t~~. LNG tank r opera-
tions require highly skilled crewmen,not only to navigate
and run the vessel,but D~SO to ensure that the cargo is held
in a proper cryOGenic state. Il1he o);)erators of LNG tankers
seem more than willing to pay premium wa 'es to attr3.ct ex-
psrienced cre~s and reduce any possible liability to the
OVl11Gr should the vessel be involved in a mi shap.
::>afety Considerationc~. If LNG should spill from its
t k, either shi,D or shoro-based storage t,;. ,it "dll vapor'-
ize Cluickly and become highly volatile. Until L G is regas-
i fi ed for distribution in domesti c pipellnes it has no odor,
hence a leak i;3 difficult to detect. Lr will only burn on
the surface of the liquid,however if it is not kept cryogen-
ically it VJill quicKly vaporize (evaporate) at norm temper-
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atures. 11he resulting V:.lpor is highly voJ.::.ltile ",:hen mixed
i th air and s"incc it will most likely be cool r than the
urrounding air it will be more dense &nci settle towards
the ground.
n Octooer 20, 1:-;44, c::et the Eas 0 io Gas Comp:Y1Y in
level l.d, the r rst "peak shaving 10 plant u ing L in the
Uni ed tates, a storage tank cont,lininG" 4 j 200 cubic meters
2Ljc
of L G collapsed. The resulting explosion and fire killed
IJO ~eople, injured over 200 more, and resulted in property
damage of' 7 million dOllar's.25 Muc h of the spilled LN was
contained in dikes at the site, however, some leaked into
streets, storm sewers, and basements and exploded. the ex-
plosian flared back to the site:.md soon th rest of the LNG
iGnited. This catastrophe set back LNG operations in the
United st tes for almost 20 yea~s even though the actual
cause of' the accident was never detennined.
atural eas in its liquid sta e represents a tremendous
concentration of potential enerey. Because L G is trans-
ported and stored at such low temperatures, heat is al ays
flowin a into the conti-liner ano the pressure vlill increase.
11hi s means the vapor must be removed or the container must
be mechanically cooled. Any brea dovm in coolin capabili y
necessitates a venting or burn off operation to keep the
ressuy'e s inside the' tank s at an acceptable level. .Becau e
the vaporized LrlG has no odor the venting alld burn off must
be carried carried out precisely.
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All troUes, including shipboard type, are heavily insulated
to reduce tho i'illlOunt of' mechanical cooling that is necessary.
Indeed,when the El Paso Paul Kayser r agro~d this past
Jun near Gibraltar she was pov,lerless for several day, but
her 8i st er sh lp, EI Paso Sonatrach, salvage the cargo even
theugh cryogenic conditions were lost for approximately 24
hours. 26 \1hile this speaks well of the inSUlatinG capabil-
i ties of LNG tankers it 8.1so was a stroke of luck that t11ere
was another empty cryogenic carrier within one days rQn~e.
If the LN had spilled on the water most tests indicate
that it would have rapidly vaporized and presented an irnmed-
iate hazard to the vessel and others within appr'oximately 10
miles. rrhe cold gas in cont2,ct with ws.ter <:l.nd \'later vapor
would form a visible fog that could be detonated by any means.
If the LNG vapor is ignited, the flmne will travel towards
the source of the leale. 27
In 196d the Bureau of hines conducted tests on the
volatility of L G spills on open water and discovered the
possibili.ty of a flamele'" explosion. il'his violent vapor-
ization could cause ignition of the Li'~G very close to the
leak source "';,.nd rupture the entire structure, rel@8.sing all
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of the L G at once.
'rank: Construction. 'l'here are several tyoe~~ of storage
tanks for LNG faci Ii ties: single ;;;tee1 tan s with outer
insulation, dual tZJ11{~3 wi th steel outer tcmks, and concrete
tanks. r.ilost L G tmks in the United S"tates are built above
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ground and rely on a dike sys~em to contain any ills. 'l'he
General Accounting Office has found that these above round
tank o not represent the safest technology. They cl i
that above g.J:'Qund tz.nk farms are sUbject to earthqual;:e,
tornado, and flood dama{:~e.29 'rhe:ce is also a great dea of
concern over the fatigue effects on the tan:o{s of storing the
cryogenic aterial over a long period of time. 'l'he GAO has
recommended that all LNG storage facilities be built under
ground or at least constructed to the stan ards applied to
nuclear facilities. 30
Shin Design. All L G t8nkers are construc"ted with a
double hull design to reduce the possibility of rupture of
the LNG tanlcs. 'i'his practice proved its worth in the recent
grounding of the .tt.:l Paso Paul Kayser. 1'he ship ran a ound
near Gilbraltar at 16 l;:not~ and opened 12 bottom t {s to the
sea. A gash approximately 500 feet long was put in the
bottom but she did not lose any LNG. Jl
LNG tankers are usually equipped ~ith bow thrusteru,
preci sion n:.ivigation, brido-e contra 1 a f enGines. and colli s-
ion avoidance systems in addition to the normal safety and
operating equi mente fhey are constructed to strict I
st~ dards and are structurally the safest link in the L G
chain.
There are two basic types of L!G ocean transport tankers
in use today. 'i1he first type is often called the . ass -
osenberg design which utilizes several free standing tanks
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that are completely independent of the hull structure. (Fig. 2)
Figure 2
/<Q 120,000 cu m. Kvaerner·Moss shi
'nsulation is applied to the exterior of the tank or
the i~terior of the ship's hull. The second major type of
L G tanker is the membrane design. (Fig• .3)
Figure .3
Ift"l'I f.:;;j~::;=:,.~.,..~•• ,:;;::;.. ,~.• ;:T.~,,==!...,.,..,~~=;'~'--~_~!:~'::::±:::',"'::='-=::::=::l::=::::::::::=:~='::::::==:=:±::::::::::=::=~~~__<
(k) 120,000 cu m Gaz-Transport ship for El Paso
In this type the ship·g hull supports t e i1'lsulation,which
is load-bearing and eperate from the cargo by a metal lin-
ing. ~his type of vessel does allow a more efficient use of
cargo space but they have had difficulties. Three of these
LNG tankers have been rejected by the Coast Guard because of
cracks developing i the polyurethane foam insulation• .32
D CO requires that the LNG tankers have a primary bar-
rier, which is actually the tank, constructed of nickel alloy
to withstand the cold temper tures. In addition to the pri-
mary barrier a secondary barrier must be able to hold the
cargo for at least 15 days before any remaining L G could
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contact the hull of the ship. 'he I 0 Code for the Con-
str ction d Equipment of hips Carrying Liquid au in BuTh
of November 12, 1975 has ensured that all t ker vessels
have enough redundancy and strict constru~tion standards that
they will leak before there could be a failure of the anks.
The Coast Guard conducts a rigorous inspection progr' and all
vessels must sUb:ni t a Letter of Compli ce before ent ring a
• S.. port. All LNG ocean tankers are SUbjected to vigorous
desi and construction requirements, testing, and material
requirements such as cracl-:-arresting steel deck aY1d hull
lates, gas-free detectors, and extensive venting. These
re uirernents make LNG vesc:JGls very expenBi ve to construct,
o erate, snd maint "n but anythinb leas could be catastrophic.
Liabili ty. I,;ost of the LNG tankers are owned or leased
by seperately incor orated subsidiaries of a parent firm. and
the Lr G receiving facili ties are owned by different legal
subsidiari es. JJ Thi s presents <l problem for p2...rti es seeking
to collect for damages. current limitations of lic.bili ty
s.tatutes could make it imnossible for collection since t e
singl.e Sllip asset company would be bankrupt. If a major
accident should occur there would be such extensive damage
that the undercapitali~ed shipowner or charte er would most
li~ely be unable to satisfy the claims. Since he vessel or
the LNG fa.cili ty v.'ould most likely be worthIes the claim ts
wo ld have a long c~d complex legal ~ction lith the insurance
company. currently liability coverage for LN terminals
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ranges from 50 million dollars to 190 million dollars per
incident.JLI- These funds could be quickly exhausted in a
major accident where loss of life was a result. In the case
of foreign ships the claimants may be ;..m21ble to secure any
leg recourse at all. The lack of strict liability statutes
may result in the federal government becoming the party of
L st resor't and tax money could be spent to satisfy claims.
siting. L G import terminals do present a potential
safety h.azard and sl1ould. be located away from major urb
centers. Currently only Boston has a large LNG import ter-
minal in a large uro'ill a.rea and it is unlikely that any fu-
ture development will take place in urban areas. The LI"G im-
port terminals at Cove Point, Illd. and hlba Island, Ga. offer
a~ acceptable risk to large urban areas. That is not to say
thrlt there are not large LNG and LPG storage f"'ciliJtie in
urbon areas. Most large cities have at least one facility
within a potentially uangerous area,but they are not marine
related.
\"hen one considers the lengthly and.. co stly siting pro-
cess, with zoning requirements and vironment~ Impact tate-
ments it becomes pparent that a great deal of cost must ac-
company the pl~~ing of a site. sites must be selected for
their safety from flooding and earthquakes as well as their
proximi ty to major distri.bution facilities. '£he average rna ine
terminal for the importation of ocean transported LNG costs ap-
prozimately 200 million dollars before start up.J5 The s"ting
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prOC8SS for NG terminals is a complicate ~olyglot of fed-
eral, stute, and 10c&1 regulations~6 i'€eney jurisdiction is
not clearly defined and each L G f"'.ci i. ty is considered on an
individua.l case basi s. 'rile ropo seci f,-,-,ell i. ty at Co jo, Cali-
fornia has been plagued by cost overruns of over 170 million
doll::rs 'Nhile bat-tling environmentalists, land develo~ ers.
indians. and the sta~e gov2rnment, even after' meeting fed-
eral standards. 37 'llhe expenses incurred obtaining' permis-
sion to construct and operate a large marine LNG terminal
vdll be passed on to the consumer in one fas ion or .another
even if the f~cility is never constructed.
Sabotage. L Gis an extremely vola.ti Ie ,substance wi th
the J,otenti 1 to destroy \!lide s.reas if it is igni.ted in a
proper fashion by saboteurs. y m' icious roups h~v the
weapons elld explosives to take over a major faci Ii ty and
actu<;llly hold an entire city as hostage. '~'ihile thi~; may be
a 'f:orst-cd.se scen:..:rio we should also reali ze that small facil-
ities and L G trucks Qre also vulnerable to terrorist activ-
i ties. A small amount of LNG, if pla.ced in a strategic 10-
cation, could present security forces with a dilema of un-
equnled;;roportions. '.':hile trucks d transport~ble con-
tainers may represent the most likely terrorist targets, he
large facilities and ocean LNG t<mkers crcnnot be overlooked.
'fhe GAO has found that all .Ll'~G facili ties lack ade. uate
securi"ty, con truction safegu ds, or contingency pI ,5, and,
that the prevention of sabotage is not b€ing investigated
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properly desoite the fact that large industrial sites and
energy comp ,ies have often been the targets of sabotage in
the past. JI)
The GAO ha.s recommended that t e follovfing rograms be
evaluated for use at L G facilities:
~Physical barriers, guards, guard dogs, ran-
dom roving patrols, and alarm systems.
-Area surveillance devices arrd intrustion
detection sys·tems; including terre~trial, in-
water, <md wat,erfront systems.
-specialized and redundant communications
a~d lighting systems.
-Hardening of s ecific structures to re-
duce t e ease of damage and control forceful
entry.
-Traffic control, air and underwater sur-
veill' ce, unique security procedures and
countermeasures for w2terfront and shore fa-
cilitie •
-security escort,~ for snips, trud::s, and
t ,3.l11c cars.
-Personnel screening procedures and visitor
clearance and control. "J9
'rhe implementcction of these recommendations would be
extremely costly and again the costs 'No-lld be passed on to
the consumer with no guarantee thu.t sabotage could be pre-
vented. Indeed some may argue that these extraordinary
security procedures may actually attract terrorists.
coast guard Safety Requirements. The Port and Tanker
Safety Act of 1 7B,(46USC J91a~ gives the U.S. Coast Guard
the reo onsibility for the safety of all U.S. flag LNG tank-
ers in any waters, and foreign 1 G tankers in U. 3. waters.
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The Coast Guard is also responsible :E'or all standards for
_ . L}OL tanker construction, m~intenance, and operatlon. ihe
Coast Guard's offici2.1 position on LT"G operations is con-
"tained in GG-478 LNG and LPG - Views and Practices, Policy
and Safety. II Basically they consider LNG to be £1. hazardous
car80 re~uiring speci~l consideration such as stringent con-
struction .ins ections a1 d biennial inspections for L G lo-
ers. i'oreign vessels must obtain a Letter of Compliance,
( LOG), and any change in o"vners or regi stry invalidates the
current LOC. 'l'he Coast 'uard feels that strict construc-
tion criteria and a strone inspection program pI y an im-
portant role in preventing 3X1Y IT1<.Lri time j, G accident.
'l'h.:: co· t Gu:::.:rd inspection procedures for the arrival
of a L G shipment begin about 21-j. hours before the shi 's
arrival wi th an inspecti on of the port :fa.cility. hi s in-
spection en<'ures that the facility is prepared for the ar-
rival, th;_.t the necessary equipment is safe 2nd operable,
;ind that adequate fire fighting equipment is prepared. At
least two personnel are talcen by helioopter or boat to t e
L m t8J1ker where they inspect the vessel for documentation,
hull condition, navigation capability, cargo security,
piping, venting, e~1l.];ine condi tion, Q.'1.d steering. '.l:he ship
inspeoti on ta\~8s approximately t':vo d one-h f "1ours and
the results are radioed to the . ptain of the Port who grants
approval :Cor the LN vessel to enter the porto
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All U. .. L G port transportatio i.;; conducted during
daylight hours ~'ith a 'o~ st Gu d helicopter and chase boat
monitorin,,; the channel for hazar s or other traffic. wny
ports require th'l.t other ocean vessels over certain m be
kept out of t e channel and traffic area when an L G tanker
with c~ go is entering a port. The entire inspection and
escort operation requires approximately 25 Coast Guard per-
sonnel for each shipment. he costs of this o¥eration are
borne by the taxpayer,but there have been recon endations
tILt the L - industry pay for the service",_; in which case
the consumer viill bear the co .,t~:. (see APpend· x III, IV)
?ersonnel 'rraining. ecognizing that the operation of
L G tankers and the ~ssociated car a transfer procedures re-
quire qualified personnel, the Coast Guard has established
minimum requirements for the r. aster. Chief r ate, Chief
gineer, First Assist t Engi eer. and the "person in charge"
of the shore facili y. roost of the training is accomplished
at maritime schools such as the Calhoon EBA gineering
School. d the Coa.,t Guard "ccept completio of hese
schools as evidence of training. In ad ition,t e Coast
Guard conducts a four - day training course on L at York-
tOltal. Va. but this is ~Jrimarily utilize.d by Goast Guard pep-
1"1Bannel and officers receive n 12 - week survey course. Y
presently the Coast Guard and IfuCO are attempti to stand-
ardize raining requirement fo ale s ip's person. el in-
volved with L G tr c sport. lost of the L G companies re-
quire that their personnel complete extensive trainin
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courses run by the parent comp y or safety consultants
such as aI' ne Safety International.'+2 'l'he most extensiva
training is conducted by he cor panie who have a vested in-
terest in the safe and orderly transport of t e cargo. The
eoa t Guard schools are desi ned for their persormel in Ot'-
der to :provide a r;Iinimum
tors <.i.l1d officers.
for their inspec-
Impact on Port Activity. Because of t e strict traffic
control regulations that 'mu t occur when L G movements are
scheduled for a port, other va sels and shippers must delay
or adv::.nce their movements by as m ell as eight hours. On
the surface this does not seem to be an unreGi.sona.ble restric-
tion, however, if L G does exp d to as much as 15 percent
of our gas supply, it will meilll arrivals at least every two
c:mo. one - h<.:.lf d<::.ys at each of the 6 to ~ ast 'oast ports.
This could conceivably cause a major impact on ve sel traffic
both in the port area and in the waters adjacent 0 major
marshal ing areas. It is impossible to accurately forecast
the c:..ctuc.l impact on other shipping with the limited data
available 8t tnis tiQe.
Pricing Policy. The federal goverrunent through the
Federal Pov!er Uonu!1is~ion which is no\'! the ede al ergy
Regulatory Cownission,( ERe), has complete statutory author-
ity over tht:: sale of natural gas in interstate transport.
[Juri t ~e yeD.rs of federal price controls the price of
.0001tur·U gas ViaS held down while the exploration companies
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had to drill deeper and look offshor and the companies were
unable to pass along these increased prices to the user'.
Natural 'as demand rose b cause of i t~ lev: price and clean -
burning Qualities and the nation was faced with a gas s ort-
age.
llfo",./ that the energy cri ses 1 s rccognl zed the JFERC as
proposed a two-phased incremental pricing pOlicy linked to
the Natural Gas Policy hct of 1978 whi ch Ii ill decontrol the
price of natural gas. The FERC plans to put the monetary
burden on large industrial boiler users for the first phase.
In e£fect they will be paying lore for thG n~tural gas they
usc than re3idential customers. The second pha e would alIa,,}
price increases to all industrial usc~s of natural gas wit
the exception of hospitals, schools, and "other pUblic ser-
vice customers." The F~C explains its policy:
liThe intent of incremental pricing, as con-
ceived by legislators whose constituents
stood to suffer from accross the bo d de-
control of gas prices, is to alleviate the
economic burden that_normally would occur
to small businesses, sm 1 i dustries and
residences ••• since residential users have
tradition ly payed more than industri
users it should be industry who pays for
new increases. "1+3
It i ironic to note that the gas distributors are to-
tally opposed to this form of incremental pricing~ argui g
that it would not be "fair" for some users to pay more for the
same product, when for years they charged ~n 1 residential
users much more th large industrial users because of the
"increased economies of scale. II Natural gas companies want
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to SGe the costly nevI gas average in with th existing do-
mestic supply and continue business as usual.
he pricin oliey of L G is very pol-tic d it is
difficult to envisage either side ga:ning a clear decision.
A tl,o to threefold ra id price increase in natural gas would
be catastrophic to most user" but industry must also reoeive
enoug return to continue to invest in distribution and
exploration. ·:.i'he LNG operation 'llill continue to be controlled
strictly by federiil regulations governinin the price th-t the
e porter may receiva, the retur that he shippin,J comp y
may m e, and the final price that tne distribution company
may charge. hll of thi regulation make e LN ind stry
costly to administer 2l1d subject to political whims with
little regard for its use as a long-tenu contributor to our
energy needs.
J?evelopments. 'l'he future of the importa.tion of L G is
irol a const8..rlt state of flux because of the international
situation d stability of potential exporter , the lack of
clear directions on the P2rt of governm nt officials, and
the potenti&l safety and environment~l problem associated
'IIi th L fG. It appears --s if ~'estern .....urope h:::..s made a 10
term cornmi tment to im.;Jorted LJ. G a.a Royal uutch lell d
ri ish Petroleum h2.ve made me.jor financial cornmi tments to
the cons ruction of the world's largest li.uii'icr.tion plant
in Bonny, igeria. Jap has completed long-t u contracts
vith Indones" a and has recently apreed to contracts at 5
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dollars pel' rnillioh BTU for the importation of Alask' LNG
f . 44rom enal ..
The United st,...'tes is currently importing on y a small
amount of LNG for "peak shaving" operations but hI Paso has
recently hired former Deputy Secretary of tate arren Chris-
topher, of Iranian fame, \;0 negotiate a contract with the
Algerian nationali zed gas COlilP y. Sonatrach. 45 This vlill
most likely lead to a considerable increase in L
tion.
importa-
At the present time there is severe overtonnage in the
ocean L G fleet but if the proDosed liquificat" on facilities
in.. igeria, UA , and Venezuela are completed as planned there
\llill probably be a severe shortage of' tankers by 19/)5 and U.
s. camp ies may charter or sell their L~G fleets to support
foreign LN operations if the U.S. does not decide to import
lange quantities for base load distribution. It appears
thD,t the U. S. deci sian 'Nill have to be made by federal poli:-
ci es, the cur:cent policies do not give enou,:rh, guidance for
capital investmsnt or foreign contract confidence. Until a
firm policy is set, the U. ,:). 11 G import indus'try '.'lill probably
continue aphazardly until 1985.
CDnclusions.
1N impor~~tion to the United States is not cost effective
because I
~We c import natural gas rom C~nada,
Mexico, and Alaska.
-Our pipeline distribution system is
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extensive enough to distribute any imported
gas to the areas I, hich require natur gas.
-Capital used i the L G importation
i dustry could be used in the construction
of t e Alaskan pipeline, other distribu ion
systems, coal gasification, or other indu~­
trial revitalization.
-u.~. shipyards can continue to build
L G tankers and J erican camp ies c
charter or sell the vessels without neces-
sarily having our own LNG im ortation in-
dustry.
-The LNG t 1 er and facility inspec-
tion program carried Qut by the Coast
Guard is an unnecessary expense to tax-
payer •
-The siting of LNG facilities will in-
volve costly legal battles that will burden
the taxpayer and consumer.
-If e U. '. will not achi eve its goal
of energy independence by increasing energy
imports •
. Port activi ties will suffer UnrCil.1-
bursable expenses because of traffic re-
strictIons during Lra operations.
- The costs of protecti 0 from s,...botage
will be passed to the consumer.
-Federal regUlations and controls "till
be oostly.
-u.s. competition for a world L G mar-
ket may drive prices to totally uneconom-
ical limits. One need only look at the oil
market to see the rmoifications.
-The forei n sources of LN
OPSC with the exception of the
are tied to
oviet Union.
-I e importation of L G will enefit only
a small segment of industry while raising the
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